This paper focuses on the analysis of corporate responsibility and also examines the question of international diffusion of norms in the context of globalization. It measures the influence of nonstate actors on foreign societies and states. It also draws on firsthand economic and financial empirical data, and then analyzes the reasons why French firms have
I. INTRODUCTION
The corporate social responsibility of multinational firms has become a crucial issue for both international relations and the international political economy. Initially restricted to corporate governance, the issue gradually came to include environmental and social questions, and now is expanding to cover other ethical matters such as labor legislation and human rights.
The many recent studies on this issue focus principally on the growth of the idea of corporate social responsibility in the United States and its effects on the international strategy of US firms.
1 These studies shed light on criticism to which these firms are subject, and examine the reasons behind this trend. They also describe the increasing ethical demands made, not of states, but of firms, which are now perceived as more capable to address a large range of complaints. The studies examine the regulatory consequences, both political and economic, of prescriptive and moral concerns. The focus has been on the emergence of a standard endogenous to the socially and culturally homogenous universe of US capitalism.
The research presented here uses these different analyses as its starting point, and takes their findings into account while raising a new issue: the spread of ethical standards beyond US borders. The authors have attempted to understand how and why a foreign norm can have an impact on a non-US capitalist society. In this respect, the French case offers an excellent example. On one hand, France, via its economy and its firms, is now a full participant in the process of globalization. On the other hand, for historical and political reasons, France maintains a sovereign vision of economic regulation. Moreover, France's humanitarian activists are not accustomed to interpreting the actions of their economic players in terms of human rights. The tension this has created between the political and economic spheres raises some fundamental issues. From the point of view of an analysis of the spread of ideas, this case shows an interesting particularity. Though the notion of corporate social responsibility originated in the US, its emphasis on human rights gives it a French flavor. This give-and-take phenomenon is in many ways characteristic of globalization as a process for the reinvention of values and traditions. 2 In this study, and with respect to international relations, we seek to clarify the link between economic globalization and the globalization of ideas.
To carry out this study, the authors have analyzed the economic behavior of the firms that make up the Société Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 stock market index, paying particular attention to their annual financial reports. These companies are the most significant in terms of market capitalization in France. They are also amongst the most internationalized in their operations. The authors based their approach on the empirical analysis of economic data available in annual financial reports, examining in particular the location of French firms abroad as well as the geographic origins of their capital. This statistical work has been supplemented by data from official government sources. In parallel to this empirical analysis, a series of interviews aimed at grasping the strategy of the main standardsetters, the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ethical rating agencies and consultants operating in this field were conducted. The authors have tried to understand the role of these moral activists 3 within the French context, their impact on the nature and methods of the assessment of firms, as well as the reasons behind the increasing power of these experts in recent years.
By combining these two principal sources of information, interviews, and data, the authors have sought to answer three questions. First, how and why must French firms pay attention to values and systems of reference which are, a priori, foreign? In other words, how did this new vision of reality spread to France? 4 This question is central to the French example in two ways. French business has developed within the context of a nation which promulgated one of the first universal declarations of human rights, and the French state, at least in its rhetoric, has made human rights one of the cornerstones of its external relations. Yet, the political and economic spheres have traditionally been strictly differentiated in France. Human rights have hitherto been exclusively the concern of the former. However, in spite of this dichotomy, human rights concerns have spilled over to the realm of business. This dynamic testifies to an important social change.
This initial question leads to a second one: the relationship between the globalization of the economy and the globalization of ideas. What is the link between the transnationalization of the economy and the circulation of norms?
5 How, in the French case, did norms and debates whose outlines and terms were initially defined in the US come to be applied to French businesses? Third, the strategic role of moral activists must be analyzed in light of both their motivation and the opportunities present in their own national contexts.
When answering these questions, the authors look at the interplay between three dynamic forces: first, the economic and intellectual spread of norms and their consequent impact on French industry; second, the specificity of the French economic and humanitarian context; and third, the role of the state and the national legal framework.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS BEHIND THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FRANCE
During the 1980s, in France as elsewhere, corporate social responsibility became a significant preoccupation of a great number of business practitioners. Various management studies from that period bear witness to this trend, as does the growth of the activity of consultants specializing in solving the social problems firms might face. In accordance with the renewal of French capitalism, stimulated by the excellent performance of the stock market in the mid 1980s, companies sought to convey a virtuous public image, and their sound financial health allowed them to allocate resources to this effect. At the same time, corporate responsibility was considered to be an internal matter, primarily concerning the management of relations among a group's employees. Managerial literature in the 1980s stressed the importance of well-being within a company, yet French businesses were unaware of the "corporate social responsibility" theme which was by then well developed in the United States. There was thus a significant time lag between French firms, that paid no attention to this question, and US society, where corporate responsibility had been debated since the 1970s in many forums and publications. However, this US debate had little impact on US managerial practices. 6 Toward the end of the 1990s, two phenomena contributed to the growing strength of the concern for ethics in French companies. Both phenomena are linked to the international scene. First, French businesses found themselves in legal trouble in the United States, and their troubles were amply reported in the French media. Their cases involved either merger-related insider trading or problems of a more political nature concerning cooperation between firms and dictatorial regimes condemned by humanitarian organizations. 7 Later, French businesses-this time in the banking sector-were investigated by US courts regarding their past as well as their political compromises. In 1997, France's largest banks became the targets of a class action lawsuit in New York. Action was brought against the banks for their activities during World War II, and the plaintiffs demanded US justice to restore their confiscated accounts. This case also attracted media attention and entailed, as in the case of Elf Aquitaine, the intervention of the French diplomatic service, which decided as a matter of sovereignty to defend these businesses. Second, these cases took place within a broader context that made them of great consideration for those principally concerned. The 1990s saw the rise of the concept of transparency and corporate responsibility, first in the US, and then within the United Nations. Companies like Nike and Reebok battled with NGOs and the media to save their public image. At the United Nations, 1997 was marked by a significant number of forums exclusively focusing on the social responsibility of multinational corporations (MNCs). Inspired by anti-globalization movements as well as by President Clinton's 1996 initiatives, UN officials decided to launch the Global Compact program. 9 For the UN, it was a return to the kind of controversial debates of the 1970s, which had surrounded MNCs and led to sanctions against South Africa. By taking the initiative of a reform aimed at mastering the negative consequences of globalization, the UN prestige was boosted, thanks to a project whose very scope reinforced its stature and that was accorded with its own definitions of good governance.
The high media profile of the debates created a particularly sensitive climate and allowed French players, both NGOs and businesses, to measure fully the extent of the problem. The global publicity corporate responsibility received confirmed the activists' belief in the necessity for action at the local and national level. Both firms and NGOs were thus well informed about a situation which had evolved throughout the mid 1990s, most particularly 1997, yet the French diplomatic service-both on the political and commercial side-showed little concern of what was at stake.
A worldwide study on NGOs and their expectations, which concentrated on the NGOs decision to focus on the business arena, indicated that this change was already taking place by the mid 1990s.
10 From this time onward, most NGOs seemed to favor some degree of cooperation with businesses and abandoned their former confrontational attitude and hostility toward the business world. The NGOs' empathy with this conceptual universe meant that humanitarians and activists both firmly believed in the ripple effect of globalization and interdependence. Thus, both were encouraged to think that the effects of this new paradigm would soon be felt in France.
During the 1980s, several pioneering organizations in France were already extolling ethical shareholding.
11 Certain religious groups began to emulate the efforts undertaken by many US congregations to promote ethics in business. 12 They attempted to raise the awareness of both the public and the financial community regarding these concerns. In 1983, one of the first ethical funds was created under the impetus of Sister Nicole Reille and the Meeschaert Investment Company. 13 It must be noted that this mobilization had only a very limited impact initially, neither attracting potential investors nor gaining the attention of business. However, during the 1990s their activities grew exponentially. This ethical fund encouraged a move toward ethical shareholding on the part of other religious congregations, for example among religious movements who discovered the stock market while engaged in international development activities, such as the Catholic Committee Against Hunger and for Development.
14 This was also the case of other organizations and NGOs, which went on to create their own investment funds, as Action against Hunger did in 1994 partnering with Crédit Lyonnais Asset Management (later this firm merged with Crédit Agricole Asset Management).
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The signs of a new concern for business thus appeared in France during the second half of the 1990s. The concept was able to develop using existing structures within firms, and because of the growing attraction this question held for businesses. Managerial and humanitarian actors were inspired by the emerging US trend. This halo effect 16 (the mimicry by certain French organizations of their US models) is a direct result of the international context prevalent in the early 1990s, and the impact it had on French business actors, who became rapidly aware of the necessity for change. However, the French state demonstrated a lack of interest in the question. analysis of the growing internationalization of French and European firms during the 1990s. Based on research intended to identify the nature of these "global firms," the results indicated that at the beginning of 1998 only 12 percent of the firms could be considered global, according to the criteria employed. Yet by the end of 1998, the proportion of global firms had in fact doubled (24 percent). The globalization of firms is notably striking in Data from the Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industry also confirm this acceleration in the internationalization of French firms during the 1990s. 21 This internationalization comprises not only the growth of external sales, but also, takes into consideration the increasing localization of production facilities abroad. North American companies are the obvious leaders in this respect (almost 300, about 40 percent of the sample), followed by European firms (197 in total, roughly 26 percent of the sample). France is among the leaders, ranking fifth in this classification measuring the international spread of business subsidiaries. Thirty-seven French firms were among the 750 world leaders (5 percent of the total), and many of those firms possessed subsidiaries in more than fifteen countries.
III. THE DOUBLE GLOBALIZATION OF FRENCH FIRMS
The growing internationalization of French business has considerably increased French companies' exposure to North American influence. At the end of the 1990s, the major French firms made a significant part of their sales not only outside France, but also outside Europe, more particularly in the United States. Nearly 80 percent of the SBF 120 firms were active in the US in 2000. US sales accounted for a significant part of the activities volume for some, and for 10 percent of them, sales in the United States represented more than 50 percent of their foreign takings. This "Americanization" of French firms in real economic terms has been reinforced by a second phase of "Americanization" in financial terms. A survey conducted in 2001, by the North American consulting firm Georgeson Shareholder, specializing in research and shareholder representation, examined the growing internationalization of the shareholdings of French and European corporations. The subjects of the survey were French companies included in the CAC 40 and European firms from the Euro Stoxx 50. This survey confirmed the increasing power of nonresident shareholders 
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in the capital of French companies. For some of these groups, such as Total Fina Elf, Vivendi Universal, Alstom, Vivendi, Axa, EADS, Alcatel or Lafarge, nonresident shareholders hold more than 50 percent of the firm's capital. But part of the real interest of this study was its attempt to assess, not just nonresident, but specifically US shareholding in the capital of French firms. Anglo-American shareholders are relatively significant in about 25 percent of the SBF 120 companies. In 2000, all of these corporations, with two exceptions-the groups belonging to the arms industry-published an annual report or had a website that emphasized the themes of corporate Thus ethical, social, environmental, and corporate governance standards enjoy a particularly high visibility in the dozen or so groups where AngloAmerican shareholders control more than 20 percent of the firm's total capital. This is the case with regard to Alstom, Alcatel, Lafarge, Axa, Danone and Vivendi. These groups are also those that figure in among the highest index levels of transnationality within the UNCTAD classifications. They are also among the first to have developed a voluntary policy regarding environmental and social issues. As early as the first half of the 1990s, the hotel group Accor (in 1993), the semiconductor manufacturer, ST Microelectronics (in 1994), the Suez Group (also in 1994), L'Oréal (in 1995), Vivendi (in 1995), and Danone (in 1997) set up programs in these areas. These businesses not only drew up the blueprint for the emergence of an ethical agenda in France, essentially focused on environmental and social issues, but also identified those businesses that might be the most receptive to ethical questions. From 2000 onwards, these programs grew in scale. For example, Danone had a program that examined ecological conservation issues and sustainable development, as did the cement manufacturer Lafarge, that signed a global partnership with WWF, the global conservation organization. All these companies are among the most internationalized businesses in France, either in terms of geographic spread or shareholding.
With a growing part of their turnover made outside of France and Europe, and with Anglo-American funds ever more present in their capital structure, French firms became singularly receptive over the course of the 1990s to developments in North America, adopting and adapting to the emerging normative standards. To a large extent, the motivations of French companies echoed those of their North American counterparts. Worries about public image and policies aimed at establishing loyalty, both internally (mobilizing staff around a cause) and externally (among consumers as much as among investors), drove this conversion. The "ethical risks" stemming from a media campaign against a firm, or its products, became a real concern for French businesses. As some cases have shown, a firm's reputation can be badly damaged, and the consequences for share value are potentially severe. In 2001, for example, the share price of Talisman Energy fell by 15 percent following the publication of a Canadian government study confirming NGO allegations of human rights violations in Sudan, where the company had operations. 
IV. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MORAL EXPERTISE FIELD 22
During the 1990s, the growing internationalization of French firms was accompanied by a professionalization of the moral evaluation of these firms. From 1997, the main professional categories existing in the United States in this field began to make their appearance in France. This was a time when these issues began to receive considerable attention in the US media, particularly in the textile and oil sectors. There was synchronization between the increasing internationalization of business and the development of moral expertise in civil society. Recent studies on moral activists have examined the role of transnational movements and their impact on distant societies. The studies do this by looking at the role of NGOs and experts in Southern and Eastern countries. 23 Conversely, here the authors have attempted to obtain a better idea of the moral activists' influence on other Northern countries, whose businesspeople have been encouraged to adopt new practices when dealing with their partners in the South or the East. Comprehending the distinctive nature of human rights based moral activism and its impact on French firms requires an understanding of the strategies of French activists in this field. The NGOs, religious movements, and journalists who are particularly active in moral assessment in France are primarily French. Yet because human rights is traditionally a political, not a commercial concern, any movement criticizing business on these grounds has tended to be radical and confrontational in nature.
The British and US approach of investigating a firm in order to urge it to modify its behavior, without questioning either its right to existence or capitalism in general, was traditionally foreign to the French critical tradition. However, a professional field opened up and took hold as the idea of moral assessment grew. Certain partnerships between actors who otherwise had nothing in common, bore witness to these changing circumstances. Those who began rating firms were the real pioneers of moral assessment, and began to promote the idea of evaluating firms from a 22. There is a considerable body of work that analyzes the work of experts in international relations and designates their function by the name "epistemic community. The development of socially responsible investment via Arèse is paradoxical. Arèse grew out of, and was initially supported by, the Caisse des Dépots et Consignations (CDC). At its origins in 1816, the CDC was a public financial institution, both specific to and representative of the French economic landscape, which blends the public and private spheres and supports public service with an economic vocation. Initially, the CDC's principal mission was to manage private deposits seeking a certain level of security and to use them to finance social and economic projects of public interest. During the twentieth century, the CDC's range of attributions and missions grew. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has taken 24. Interview with Sarj Nahal, Financial Analyst, Arèse, in Paris (July 2001 Thus, the private sector took over a new public good, in keeping with these new expectations. By the mid 1990s, the belief in the development of a market of virtue and the ethical assessment of firms encouraged the creation of new professional positions within companies. These positions were created to respond to social pressure and, even more so, to anticipate them. 33 The "déontologue," the French version of the US "ethical officer," had now appeared in the French market.
The job entails communicating with the public on sensitive issues that might confront companies, such as social, ethical, and human rights concerns. The ethical officer must be equipped with a certain know-how in handling highly nuanced public questions, including a full awareness of the subtle particularities of the French system. A recent study shows that major firms have tended to recruit senior civil servants to be their ethical officers.
34
At the end of 1999, an association called the Observatoire sur la Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises (ORSE-Observatory on Corporate Social Responsibility) was created bringing together the forty or so companies that boast an ethical officer.
Consulting and audit firms make up a fourth type of expert in the "virtuous marketplace." Yet in France, at least for the time being, only a few have gone into this field. Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) is the major player among the Big Five accounting firms, though KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, and Ernst & Young all belong to ORSE. PWC was a pioneer in the French ethical consulting market, working first for the subsidiaries of US firms in France, and then by carrying out ethical audits for French businesses. 35 This new dimension of the transnationalization of business ethics is still at an early stage, yet it could prove decisive in the years to come. 
V. FRENCH FIRMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As previously stated, corporate social responsibility is gaining new ground in France. During the 1980s, it was mainly concerned with staff-industrial relations within French corporations. By the 1990s, social responsibility, mainly on environmental issues, had expanded to include the relations between businesses and their external partners, cities, the social fabric surrounding them, and their fellow citizens. Finally, and as the last stage in this expansion of the moral concern for responsibility, a number of French firms are now asked to account for their activities abroad from a human rights perspective.
The vast majority of companies listed on the CAC 40 or the SBF 120 have subsidiaries or other commercial activities in many countries directly targeted by human rights critics. When the FTSE, one of the main global index providers, launched its ethical index in July 2001, it excluded manyaround ten-French firms on the basis of human rights criteria. 36 Paradoxically, some of these firms are extremely progressive on corporate governance or environmental questions. Among the firms excluded on human rights grounds were Air Liquide, Saint Gobain, Bouygues, Lafarge, Schneider Electric, Crédit Lyonnais, Lagardère, Thalès, Alstom, and Legrand.
The 202 firms selected by this ethical index comprise a large number of British firms (eighty-three)-a bias largely explained by the British origins of the index provider 37 -and German firms (seventeen). France is next with fifteen companies, ahead of the Swiss (eleven), Dutch (eleven), and Italian (eleven) companies (most surprisingly no Scandinavian firms were selected). Fewer than 15 percent of SBF-listed firms are represented in the FTSE ethical index (almost 40 percent from the CAC 40). Companies excluded due to human rights concerns represent a little more than 8 percent of the SBF 120 and almost a quarter of the CAC 40. As for the Dow Jones Stoxx 36. FTSE4GOOD, a "socially responsible" index, selects the firms to be included by "screening" them on several criteria. Firms operating in certain sectors, such as nuclear energy, the arms industry, or tobacco products, are automatically excluded. The firms that are retained are then graded according to three other criteria: the environment, human rights, and stakeholder relations. Most French firms are excluded on the basis of this last criterion (twenty-one firms), next on environmental grounds (nineteen firms), and finally for human rights reasons (ten firms The analysis of different sources of information offers more precision concerning the presence of French firms in developing countries, both those that are respectful of human rights and those that are not. In the first place, studies carried out on the internationalization of French firms by the Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industry underline the geographical bias of French firms, with French groups being particularly present in African and Middle Eastern countries.
An important study calculating an indicator of relative bilateral intensity that isolates the effects of the size of the country of origin and the receiving country (thus allowing for the unique measurement of the intensity of economic relations between two countries), reveals that French groups are in fact the leaders in a great many African and Middle Eastern countries, some of which have very poor human rights records. France holds a dominant position in countries with which it has historical ties, most notably eleven sub-Saharan countries, Algeria, and Tunisia. Total Fina Elf is present in Yemen, the Congo, Gabon, Mauritania, and also in Angola and Burma (Myanmar). Peugeot is a leader in Algeria, as is BNP Paribas in Tunisia. 40 In their sample from the SBF 120, the authors have attempted to evaluate, through the use of official sources, the presence of publicly held groups in developing countries. The latter being ranked according to human rights criteria. They have created a scale of four levels of nonrespect for human rights with which to evaluate the human rights record of developing countries. Level 1 corresponds to countries under sanctions within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN; level 2 corresponds to countries under unilateral North American sanctions (if the country is already included in the UN list, we have left this country at level 1); finally, levels 3 and 4 correspond to countries appearing on the Freedom House index under the "non free" heading as well as those included in Amnesty International's "geography of corporate risk," or those evaluated negatively by other NGOs (FIDH, Human Rights Watch) .
Analysis of the data from annual reports has in turn helped to establish a map of French corporate presence around the world. Out of a total of 2,400 subsidiaries listed in this sample, only one-third are located in countries under sanction at any of the above levels for the nonrespect of human rights. However, if one adjusts this first analysis to take into account only those subsidiaries located in developing countries (a little more than 1,250), the result is much higher, with more than 50 percent of subsidiaries established in countries with a sanction level of 1, 2, 3, or 4.
The analysis of financial reports also helps to give an idea of the propensity of firms to establish themselves or not in countries that respect human rights. However, it can only amount to an approximation. Many activities are not publicly listed, as annual reports are only required to provide an inventory of fully owned subsidiaries. Therefore, a mere onefourth of SBF 120 firms indicate one or more establishments in China. Yet, with more than fifty subsidiaries (just after Brazil with a total of approximately sixty-five), China is the second most prevalent developing world destination for SBF companies. 
China is the number one nondemocratic location for French businesses abroad according to information compiled from their annual financial reports. However, the level of commercial activity in general is actually far superior to that revealed by this single source. For example, in comparison to countries like Algeria or Iran (in each of which only seven SBF 120 companies are listed as having concerns), or Saudi Arabia, Sudan, or Burma (Myanmar) (where no commercial activity or foreign direct investment is listed) China is superior. If a person were to base a study entirely on the information gleaned from annual financial reports of French companies, the firms would appear to be relatively virtuous and respectful of human rights in their implementation strategy. If one constructs a ratio of nondemocratic countries against the total of developing countries in which SBF 120 firms are concerned, one obtains an indicator showing the extent to which firms have a tendency to invest in countries that do not respect human rights. Due to a lack of available data, not all of the SBF 120 firms can be included.
Nevertheless, the ratio and the classification so obtained constitute a first approximation of an SBF 120 firm Human Rights Indicator. Among those firms with a relatively high ratio-that is, whose investments in countries with poor human right records constitute a relatively high proportion of their total investment in the developing world (bearing in mind the incomplete nature of the information contained in financial reports), are those which are the most international in nature, in particular financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) as well as certain firms active in the petroleum sector. Industrial manufacturing groups range across the spectrum, with Vallourec and Usinor (now Arcelor) ranking first and last in the index. Nevertheless, the index and the classification of French firms and human rights obtained, reflect a somewhat incomplete image. Crosschecking this data with other sources of information allows one to appreciate the size of the gap between the data listed in the annual financial reports and the real level of activity. For instance, looking at Cuba, the following was found. Between 1995 and 2000, the influx of FDI is estimated to have been almost US$ 5 billion, 4.2 billion of which has already been disbursed and is essentially concentrated in tourism, basic industry, the power industry, and telecommunications. In total, almost 370 firms from forty-six countries operate on the island. Of this total, approximately sixty are French companies, roughly 17 percent of the total. The French share of FDI in the island represents 5.5 percent of the total, compared with the more than US$ 1 billion from Spain (25 percent), US$ 840 million from Canada (20 percent), and US$ 800 million from Italy (19 percent). France and the United Kingdom, with 5.5 percent and 3.3 percent respectively of the FDI total, appear in fourth and fifth positions.
Another database, from Transparency International, reveals that French companies are perceived to be among the most likely bribers. Based on a survey of 835 interviews, which were carried out between December 2001 and March 2002, principally with senior executives of domestic and foreign companies, the Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002 underlines that French, Japanese, and US firms are the countries, among the OECD countries, that are perceived to have strong propensities to pay or offer bribes in order to win or retain business. 41 France and the United States are also, according to this survey, the governments principally associated with practices such as diplomatic or political pressure; financial pressure tied foreign aid; and favors and gifts given to officials, used to gain unfair advantage in international trade and investment.
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VI. THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIRTUE MARKET: ALTRUISTIC UTILITARIANISM VERSUS SELFISH MONETARISM
As they become ever more internationalized and operational in numerous nondemocratic developing nations, French firms are increasingly exposed to NGO criticism. They are confronted with a double threat: first, the possibility that some humanitarian movements will criticize their activities on the grounds of compromising activities by their subsidiaries in the developing world; and second, that elements of US society-the courts or the media- will react negatively on the basis of these reports. As a consequence, certain French actors have been attempting since the late 1990s, to anticipate a specifically French reaction to their potentially dubious activities. This anticipation has been spurred on further by the fact that the French media has entered the fray. 43 This move toward the normative signals a change in beliefs. The antiFriedman belief, according to which virtue can indeed yield profit, has gained ground, and a conversion to humanitarianism has thus become an opportunity for businesses to seize. Indeed, many English language publications attempt to prove, on a statistical basis, that the best businesses are those that are the most receptive to human rights issues. Moreover, there is a belief that the businesses can perform better precisely because of the care they attach to their public image. 44 Modeled on certain conventions existing at the international level within the UN or in the US, 45 partnerships are beginning to form between NGOs and businesses. NGOs are invited by businesspeople to carry out social audits of their activities on French soil. In addition, they equally survey the activities of their subsidiaries or subcontractors abroad. The strategy of the firms, as much as that of the NGOs, is interesting to study in this respect. Faced with the opening of the new market of virtue, several pioneers have chosen to invest in a domain that they believe and hope will bear fruit.
Faith in the profitability of a virtuous marketplace motivates and directs their strategy. For the NGOs the gamble appears audacious. Some of them have decided to cooperate with businesses in order to inspect their activities and to grant them, if these were to prove sufficiently respectable, their approval in return. By making this choice, NGOs have laid themselves open to criticism from their competitors in the humanitarian sector. The NGOs have been accused of seeking profit and betraying their ideals. As a consequence, free-riding holds certain risks and depends on the success of this foray by humanitarian actors into the field of corporate moral expertise.
Also in the mid 1990s, the increasing activism of NGOs in questioning firms on human rights grounds led some of them to undertake a more meaningful long-term dialogue with industry and the financial sector. 
Vol. 27 1342 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY whose Burmese (Myanmar) operations were the subject of a special report in October 1996, the FIDH replied favorably to a request from a major retail chain to advise it on human rights issues. 46 At this time, Carrefour was one of the most internationalized firms in France as well as a leader in the distribution sector. It was also one of the first in its sector to carry out a significant audit of its suppliers, as early as 1999 (eighty social audits carried out on sixty suppliers worldwide). In 2001, FIDH began a new phase of activity directed at the private sector by creating, with the support of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC), and the company managing the Post Office (La Poste), an ethical profit sharing fund exclusively focused on human rights. 47 A number of businesses are now actively soliciting audit services from human rights pioneers. In the current context, they could benefit from the publicity that is favoring the "virtuous." However, the potential cost of such a strategy could nonetheless be significant. Obviously, the risk of being discredited is fairly limited in the sense that it is the firm that takes the initiative in setting up the procedure. On the other hand, the cost of the study could be considerable, and above all, the findings could force costly management changes. Pioneers are motivated by the idea that, given time, their "good faith" will yield benefits.
In France, the distribution sector was drawn into this virtuous circle, following the examples of Carrefour and Monoprix. Pioneers are encouraged in their approach by the belief that its costs will be offset-those who pay the price now will see their investment pay off later-while those who are reluctant to do so will see their activities suffer as a result of negative publicity. The contagious effect by which these beliefs are spread attests to the force of the US model and its altruistic utilitarianism, an association between interests and virtue founded on the idea that virtue is economically worthwhile. 48 The entrepreneurs of virtue have created new creeds, associating profitability and human rights, which stand in opposition to traditional monetarist science.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The impact of the globalization of ideas in France has been increasing, in that it has taken place in parallel with the globalization of capital and of the markets in which French firms operate. In the same way, humanitarian values and corporate social responsibility have seen their importance magnified, because they overlap with the global strategies and interests of French businesses. Thus, it was easier to convince French firms of the need to be open to a new approach, drawn from Anglo-American precedents, which encompass social, environmental, and human rights responsibilities. In sum, values have begun to influence the definition of interests, and a social construct of economic reality has increasingly taken shape since the end of the 1990s.
In regulatory terms, the heart of the issue lies at the intersection of the private sector and the public realm. The private market of virtue incites and encourages French capitalism, and the most effective firms to adopt new codes of conduct. This contagious phenomenon, spread via the market, has until now progressed relatively easily, and without undue involvement by the state. However, currently, as this new approach to management spreads, and the media increasingly focuses on these issues, the French state finds itself compelled to react.
The late return of the French state into a domain that should have been one of its interests all along, the law and specifically that involving human rights, is somewhat embarrassing. Given the changing context, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should have been more discriminate when it began to encourage French investment abroad. Yet, there is a considerable gap between the principles guiding French foreign policy and the concerns of economic actors regarding human rights.
In a number of instances, and for reasons that are both political (the affirmation of French sovereignty) and economic (the conquest of markets neglected by US leaders), French leaders encourage investment in areas of the world that are highly sensitive from a human rights perspective. Therefore, the Quai d'Orsay (French Foreign Office) and the Medef 49 (French Business Confederation) in no way inhibit investment in Cuba, China, Burma (Myanmar), or in a certain number of Arab countries whose regimes display little concern for human rights. In particular, the traditional French, pro-Arab foreign policy, as illustrated by the sale of a nuclear plant to Iraq during the 1980s, has led them to ignore this norm.
Many French diplomats believe that human rights should not be taken into account in the framing of foreign policy. 50 Taking human rights under consideration would create an obstacle to the decision making process. Moreover, it could hamper the interests of major French groups. The Total Fina Elf case serves as an illustration.
Total is able to be active in countries where its direct competitors, notably North American, are constrained by their national administrations. While oil firms like the British company British Petroleum (BP), for example, which has significant assets in the US, are relatively cautious in their international activities, Total has no such constraints (Total Fina Elf keeps a low profile in the US, except for its chemical activities, which are largely unknown to US consumers). In Burma (Myanmar), Total has been relatively free to operate. However, UK policy, dating back to the time of John Major's government, differs in that the UK government has the right to ask British companies to withdraw from controversial countries, as was the case of the British oil producer, Premier, in Burma (Myanmar).
The regulatory task is somewhat easier for the Ministry of the Economy. It is worth noting that the Ministry of the Economy is gaining influence over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this respect. Only recently, did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs start to increase its interest and involvement on these issues. 51 Certain national commercial regulations, thus echo new ethical concerns, such as the law on New Regulations for Business (NRE), enacted in July 2001, under which businesses must undertake social and environmental reporting. Moreover, the recent increase in initiatives, such as awards for the quality of environmental information reported by French firms, attests to a growing interest in these issues. European integration could encourage French decision makers to take further steps. Given that European Commissioners such as Chris Patten and Pascal Lamy are promoting the inclusion of social, environmental, and human rights con-cerns in European external relations, it is probable that ethical business practices will find a place in the European approach as well.
The new regulatory framework reflects the orientation already taken by some of the most important nationalized French groups. Many of them (EDF-GDF, the RATP, SNCF, La Poste, CDC, and Crédit Agricole) have been willing to include human rights in their agenda. Do these last examples signify a self-subversion of the authors' work?
52 As shown, a significant presence in the United States, combined with a significant holding by US investors of French capital, tends to induce firms to adopt "socially responsible" behavior. Nonetheless, there are many counter-examples. Some firms that are not listed on the stock market (because they are nationally held), and that have no strong position on the US market, have still complied enthusiastically with this norm. A great many state companies, perhaps because their activity and their raison d'être are linked to "public service" and to the idea of a "common good," have been very active on the social and environmental front. Corporate responsibility represents a natural evolution of their public service mission. One of the paradoxes of the spread of these norms is that large, nationalized groups have seen fit to draw on ideas created in the private sector and adapt them to their own public missions.
Thus, even a strongly centralized state, like France, can see its structures and institutions challenged by the market-driven transnationalization of ideas. This market based "contagion" must, sooner or later, provoke a state reaction. A reaction that is increasingly urgent, because not just activists, but ordinary citizens, are engaged in pressing these themes. A public initiative of virtue-based regulation for the marketplace is being put into place via the private and transnational spheres. In time, this could encourage state reform, and European integration makes this all the more likely. 52 . By "self-subversion" the authors are referring to Hirschman's recommended selfsubversion exercises, which consist of refuting one's own generalizations: "skepticism toward other people's claims to spectacular theoretical discoveries is, of course, not a particularly noteworthy trait. It is however more unusual to develop this sort of reaction to one's own generalizations or theoretical constructs." ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, A PROPENSITY TO SELF-SUBVERSION 85 (1995).
